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Abstract: Radical Islamism is a challenging new pheno-
menon in the modern world, including Indonesia. Solo 
presents an especially interesting case because of the 
disproportionate nature of the radical Islamic groups that 
have emerged here especially that of the Front Pemuda 
Islam Surakarta (FPIS) as well as other vigilante groups in 
the city. This paper will explore and map out the nature of 
Islam in Solo and asks what triggers the the emergence of 
the radical groups here. Dramatic changes at the national 
level have made Solo more politically conducive for radical 
Islamic groups, but this is not the only reason why they 
have flourished. In addition, historical and sociological 
factors may help such groups to emerge. Hence, the 
dominance of the abangan group (the nominal Muslims) and 
the intensity of dakwah (preaching) conducted by some 
Islamic groups has given rise to the ‘instant’ Muslims who 
see Islam as the ultimate solution to their problems. The 
call for jihād and the application of sharī‘ah laws are among 
the contentious political style that the groups propagated. It 
is these issues that the paper is interested to investigate.  
Keywords: Radical Islam, jiha >d, Ngruki, abangan. 
Introduction 
Bali blast on October 12, 2002 has put Pondok Ngruki in 
particular and Solo in general in a global spotlight. The involvement 
some of Pondok Ngruki’s graduates and its networks in Solo in the 
bombings has drawn many people’s attention to this specific area. 
Previously Solo is identical the royal Mataram kingdoms, the heartland 
of Javanese culture, graciousness and well-mannered ladies, and 
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gorgeous batiks.1 Currently, to talk about the Solo city, we could not 
avoid to discuss the existence of Pondok Ngruki and its related radical 
Islamic movements such as Usrah (1980s), Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI, 
1993), KOMPAK2 of DDII (1998), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia 
(MMI, 2000), and Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT, 2008). In fact, the 
phenomenon of Islamic radicalism in Solo is also characterized by the 
existence of some vigilante groups such as Front Pemuda Islam 
Surakarta (FPIS), Laskar Hizbullah, and Laskar Jundullah. All above 
assure my assumption that Solo is a fertile land for religious radicalism. 
The existence of these radical Islamic groups is interesting to study 
especially to reveal the real problem behind these phenomena. 
 Radical Islamic groups are not arising from a single factor, but 
many different ones. Some factors intertwined each other which finally 
gave to the rise of such radical groups. However, while Indonesian 
Muslims generally undergo the same global and national phenomena, 
some local factors may also play a significant role in this occurrence. In 
the global context, the heightening of religious consciousness among 
Indonesian Muslims is due partly to the modernization and 
globalization processes. While in the national context, the political 
conduciveness plays a significant role in the rising of Islamic radical 
groups in many different parts of Indonesia. This paper will observe 
the phenomena of radical Islamic groups in Solo not only from the 
above perspectives, but also from some local characteristics of Solo. 
the distinct character of Solo culture such as ethnicity, economics, and 
religion are the central factors to the rise of Islamic radical groups. As 
far as the nature of Islam in Solo is concerned, I should pay attention 
to the domain of religion, especially to the Islamization process of the 
lower-class of the abangan, who being deprived socially, economically, 
and politically, tend to resort to Islam as their way out from their 
problem. It is this kind of ‘instant’ re-Islamization that finally led them 
to the fold of Islamic radicalism. 
The Framework of Radical Islamism 
In the perspective of social movement, the phenomenon of 
Islamic fundamentalism can be viewed as a symptom of social 
resistance, rather than to see Islam as the source of violence. 
                                                                
1 Batik refers to a generic wax-resist dyeing technique used on textile. 
2 KOMPAK stands for Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis (Action Committee for 
Crisis Response). 
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According relative deprivation theory, a social movement could 
emerge due to social changes which influence the social structure of a 
society. Unwanted cultural changes forced some communities to shift 
the direction of the changes to meet their necessities. In the context of 
Solo, social and cultural changes are influenced by modernization and 
globalization, political conduciveness, and local cultures of Solo. 
Globalized-world as a result of modern technology has shrunk the 
world into a global village. The rapid mainstream of information and 
technology has marginalized the role of religion in the society, 
especially Muslims. In Islamic fundamentalism perspectives, moderni-
zation is viewed as an immense threat for Muslims since it is not only a 
concept but it is a social process which produces social products. 
Traditional Islamic values is marginalized, swept out, and even 
replaced by Western values. Conventional Islamic preaching no longer 
could restrain the mainstream of modernization from the West. 
Among the influence of modernization and globalization is the widely 
spread of secularism as a part of ghazw al-fikr (intellectual infiltration). 
The inabilities of some Muslims’ groups to follow the beat of 
modernity have given the rise of such Islamic revivalist groups as a way 
to counter to modernization. The demand of sharī‘ah in many Muslim 
countries is one of the ways of Muslims to counter Western-
modernization. However, since the mainstream is led by Western 
countries, the encounter of modernization and globalization is also 
filled with the sentiment of anti-Western countries. The hegemonic 
power of some Western countries toward Muslim countries to some 
extend also heightened the situation. The emergence of Jama’ah 
Islamiyah (JI) in Ngruki may be taken as a case point. 
On the political sphere, on the other hand, the dramatic political 
change in Indonesia is such a conducive atmosphere for the emergence 
of radical Islamic groups. Political pressure of the Old and New Order 
to some extend has deprived the society, especially Muslims from 
participating in the political life.. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the 
downfall of Suharto regime in 1998 was marked by the emergence of 
some radical Islamic groups as part of the halted Islamic revivalism 
since the early 1980s. Despite some disappointment among Muslims 
during the New Order era, Islamic religious life was blossoming 
especially in the last ten years.3 The Islamic resurgence was featured by 
                                                                
3 Azyumardi Azra, “Globalization of Indonesian Muslim Discourse: Contemporary 
Religio-Intellectual Connections between Indonesia and The Middle East,” in Johan 
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the increasing of religious sermons in urban areas, the establishment of 
some Islamic institutions, the more intensive usage of Muslims’ formal 
dress, and finally the uprising phenomenon of the formalization of 
sharī‘ah Islam.4 Eventually, the ongoing process of “santrinization”5 
marked the beginning of Indonesian Muslim society era. The dramatic 
changes of the politics to the Reformation Era have escalated the 
Islamic resurgence in general. On the other hand, the political tension 
was followed by some ethnic conflicts in some regions, especially 
religious conflicts such as in Poso and Ambon. Not only was the 
current climate support the steadily religious resurgence from the New 
Order,6 but it also gave the rise of some radical Islamic groups. 
Tantamount to that, the local social culture of Solo plays a 
significant role in the dissemination of the ideals of Islamic resurgence 
in the form of radicalism. The Solonese especially Muslims have a 
distinctive characteristic culture which is shaped by many factors such 
as ethnicity, economics, politics, and religion. The characteristics of 
society in the form of uniformities and regularities create such kind of 
system or structure in which the society lives together.7 Therefore, the 
above factors not only affected to the behaviour and social structure of 
the society, but also gave significant impact toward the distinct culture 
of the Solonese. In this respect, Brenkman asserts that “culture is a site 
of reciprocal relationships and mutual understandings” including social 
domination, exploitation, and power pervasive.8 Historical 
backgrounds of the Solonese since the early years of its formation 
                                                                                                                                      
Meuleman, Islam in the Era of Globalization: Muslim attitude towards modernity and identity 
(London: Routledge-Curzon, 2002). 
4 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the Sate in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003). 
5 “Santrinization” is from the term santri (boarding school pupils), but in general it to 
refer to devout Muslims. The term santrinisasi is an abundant shifting from abangan to 
devout Muslim. 
6 According to the survey conducted by the Centre for Islamic and Social Studies 
(Pusat Pengkajian Islam & Masyarakat, PPIM) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, there are 
significant increasing percentage of Muslims who agree to the implementation of 
Islamic sharī‘ah from 58% in 2001 to 67% in 2002. That it should be the government 
that reinforce the implementation of Islamic sharī‘ah from 61,4% in 2001 to 71% in 
2002. Further on this account see “Makin Saleh, Makin Curiga,” Tempo, December 30, 
2001, pp.48-49; “Makin Agamis di Tahun Kemudian,” Tempo, December 29, 2002, p. 
87. 
7 E.E. Evans Pritchard, Social Anthropology (London: Cohen & West Ltd, 1969), p. 23. 
8 John Brenkman, Culture and Domination (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. vii. 
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resulted in the majority of abangan in Solo. History records that the 
lower level abangan Javanese has been undergoing such social, 
economics, and political deprivations. On the other hand, the failure of 
religious and cultural leaders to bond the society has fragmented them 
into such loose society. In turn, it was within such loose abangan 
society that any social revivalism is flourishing. Many religious leaders 
are successful in framing the current social, political, and global 
situation with Islamic issues and finally lead them into a certain social 
movement. It is such Islamic doctrines as shari >‘ah which they believe 
could solve their current problems fast and precisely. Such ‘instant 
convert’ from abangan to pious Muslims, finally, leads them to radical 
Islamism. 
Radical Islamic Groups in Solo 
Radical Islamism has become one of the phenomena of social 
radicalism in Solo. Apart from the current radical Islamism, history 
records that social radicalism in Solo ranges from “left” to “right” 
wings. Not only did radicalism flourish prior to the Indonesian 
independence, it also blossom after the Indonesian independence 
during both the Old and New Order political system. While such 
radicalism is not quite significant in other cities, many people believe 
that there should be some local culture which partially takes part in 
such radical activities. Therefore, the history of radicalism in Solo is 
significant to see this phenomena comprehensively, especially why 
such activities continuously happened during the current the 
Reformation Era.  
Obviously, social radicalism should be distinguished from Islamic 
radicalism in Solo. Prior to the Indonesian independence, the 
development of the Sarekat Islam (1912) in Solo eventually had given 
rise to social radicalism. That is the reason why Shiraishi9 asserts that 
the social movements in Solo gave much influence to the emergence 
of social movements in other parts of Indonesia. In Solo itself, the SI 
became a vehicle for the grass-root to protest against the government 
at the time, the Dutch government as well as the kingdoms. In 
addition to the central role of the Solonese in the Javanese culture, 
John Pemberton and Stephen Headley focus their attention to 
                                                                
9 Takashi Siraishi, An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java 1912-1926 (Itacha, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1990). 
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Surakarta as the heartland of the Javanese culture.10 To add another 
social radicalism in Solo, anti-Chinese riot broke up in this region in 
1980 followed by the same riots in other regions in Central Java. The 
emergence of Mega-Bintang coined by Mudrick M. Sangidoe of Solo 
prior to the election of 1997 was also a radical phenomenon of the 
alliance between the enormous followers of the Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struge, PDI-P) 
and the tiny mass of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United 
Development Party, PPP).11 Finally, the social riots prior and after the 
downfall of Suharto regime were also significant phenomena to include 
to the radical characteristics of the Solonese. Although Solo was far 
from the central government of Indonesia, the riots in the city was as 
worse as those in Jakarta. Undeniably, therefore, several social 
observers state that Solo is a barometer of national stability. 
Turning to the Islamic radicalism sphere during the New Order, 
Pondok Ngruki was the only phenomenon of Islamic radicalism in the 
region. The oppositions of Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir 
to the government in the late 1970s were in the form of their rejection 
to be involved in the election and also to the Pancasila. Their 
involvement in the Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) of Adjengan 
Masduki was finally followed the case of Komando Jihad in the region, 
i.e, the assassination of Purwanto, vice rector of the Universitas 
Sebelas Maret, UNS (1979), and also Lampung Berdarah (1989).12 The 
detention of Sungkar and Ba’asyir on the accusation of undermining 
the government in the early 1980s even did not stop them. After being 
released 1984, they were involved again in another Islamic movement 
                                                                
10 John Pemberton, On the Subject of ‘Java’ (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 
1994); Stephen C. Headly, Durga’s Mosque: Cosmology, Conversion and Community in Central 
Javanese Islam (Singapore: ISEAS, 2004). 
11 The slogan of Mega-Bintang was enormously responded by their constituents in 
many big cities such as Surabaya, Pasuruan, Madura, and Banjarmasin. Along with the 
eruption of this ‘social movement’, the PPP of Solo was engaged in putihisasi 
(‘whitening’) campaign to counteract of kuningisasi (‘yellowing’) of Golkar cadres who 
were painting the town to match the party colour. Further, see John T. Sidel, Riots, 
Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 2006), p. 64. 
12 Known also as Talangsari incident or the Terror of Warsidi. Further see Abdul 
Syukur, Gerakan Usrah di Indonesia: Peristiwa Lampung 1989 (Yogyakarta: Penerbit 
Ombak, 2003). 
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known as Usrah,13 a movement to recruit more members of the NII. 
Finally, the harsh political attitude of the government to them and 
Muslims in general in the 1980s forced them to exile to Malaysia. Not 
only was they kept contact with their networks and devotees in 
Indonesia, they even broadened their networks internationally. It was 
in 1993 when they established an independence clandestine Islamic 
movement known later as the Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI). The broad 
networks of this underground organization are not only covered 
Southeast Asia, but also to Afghanistan. This organization was not well 
known yet until they return to Indonesia and discovered that it was the 
responsible for some devastating bombs in 2000 and also the Bali 
bombings in 2002.  
The dramatic political changes in Indonesia were partly responsible 
for the emergence and re-emergence of some radical Islamic groups. 
These groups emerged in many forms either formal organization such 
as the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Council of Indonesian Mujahidin, 
MMI), clandestine organizations such as the Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI), or 
in the form of vigilante forces (laskar) such as the Laskar Jihad and the 
Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front, FPI). This new era is 
also marked by the increasing demand of implementation of sharī‘ah in 
many parts of Indonesia. Along with the emergence of the radical 
Islamic groups, the demand of the application of sharī‘ah laws emerges 
in some cities in Indonesia. In the context of Solo, the phenomenon of 
Pondok Ngruki (networks) re-emerged along with the JI. Although the 
demand of the application of sharī‘ah laws is not quite significant in 
Solo, some vigilante forces also emerged tremendously especially 
during the early years of post-Soeharto era which were more engaged 
on anti-immoral (ma`s}iyah) activities. The Pondok Ngruki in its relation 
with the JI and the FPIS14 will represent the radical groups in this 
discussion. 
                                                                
13 Usrah literally means nuclear family. This is such an organic term used by several 
Islamic movements to name their Islamic teachings’ activities. Due to the stigma of 
Usrah, several Islamic movements employed the word halaqah (literally mean circle) at 
the end of 1980s, and finally they employ tarbiyah (literally mean education) since the 
end of 1990s until recently.  
14 Some other vigilante forces are Laskar Jundullah (the soldier of Allah), Laskar 
Hizbullah Sunan Bonang, Hawariyyun (the disciples), Brigade Hizbullah (the party of Allah 
Brigade), Barisan Bismillah (the Path of Bismillah), and Al-Ishlah (the reform). While 
some branch-level vigilante forces are the Gerakan Pemuda Ka’bah (the Ka’bah Youth 
Movement, GPK) and Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Defender Front). 
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Some violent events during the post-Suharto era were allegedly 
committed by Ba’asyir (Pondok Ngruki). The involvement of some 
Ngruki graduates in the Bali bombings, and the revealed JI’s 
responsibility for some devastated bombings convinced the authorities 
that Ba’asyir was the spiritual leader of the JI as the successor of 
Abdullah Sungkar. Finally, the authorities arrested him in October 
2002 and began to bring him into trials. Undeniably, based on the all 
the above many people assumed that Pondok Ngruki is the centre for 
radical Islamism in sense of violence in Indonesia. Although some 
people are may objected to this accusation, the facts has proved on the 
other way around. In addition, the existence of several other Ngruki-
like pesantrens co-founded by Ngruki graduates in the outer regions of 
Solo, as Dār al-Shahadah in Boyolali and Ma’had Aly Al-Nūr in 
Sukoharjo, convinced people to the accusation. Although the 
authorities could not prove the involvement of Ba’asyir in the JI, the 
existence of JI is undeniable. Moreover, that the region of Solo is quite 
central for JI underlined my suspicious that the region is prolific of 
such radical Islamism.  
Similar to the Front Pembela Islam (FPI) of Habieb Rizieq in 
Jakarta, the existence of the Front Pemuda Islam Surakarta (FPIS) as a 
vigilante force is significant in Solo.15 As a local Islamic group, 
however, the FPIS is not only concerned with local issues in Solo but 
also in some national and international issues. Flock of people on the 
streets protesting some government’s policies as well as US policies on 
Muslim world were among the activities of this organization. Similar to 
some other vigilante forces in Indonesia, the FPIS is concerned mostly 
with anti-ma‘s}iyah (anti-immorality) actions. Although the FPIS knows 
exactly that Indonesia is not an Islamic state, this organization demand 
to reinforce the existing regulations concerning to moral issues. 
Therefore, the FPIS sweep some places such as prostitutions, gambling 
centres, cafes, and hotels which it regards as violating God’s law. The 
most bizarre thing is its “sweeping” of foreigners especially Americans 
living in hotels in Solo. This action was conducted as its concern and 
sympathy to some Middle Eastern Muslim counties, especially to Iraq 
which was ‘invaded’ by the US. Interestingly, the FPIS is not a new 
                                                                
15 Not to be misunderstood with the Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front, FPI) 
of Habieb Rizieq in Jakarta. The FPIS has nothing to do with the FPI, although the 
FPI has also its branch in Solo. Many times, some journalists wrongly wrote the FPIS 
as Front Pembela Islam Surakarta. 
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phenomenon in Solo since it is only such a mean for another radical 
Islamic group well known as Jama’ah Gumuk. Finally, the existence of 
the FPIS among other vigilante forces and also Jama’ah Gumuk 
convinced me that Solo is prolific for radical Islamic groups. One 
significant feature of this radical Islamism is that most of its members 
are from lower level abangan communities at the periphery or suburb 
areas of Solo. 
Islamization and Abangan: the Fragmentation of Religious 
Authority 
The phenomenon of abangan as a majority in Solo marks the failure 
of Islamization in the region. Unlike other regions of Java in which 
Islamization was conducted by independent ‘ulama>’s such as Wali 
Songo, the process of Islamization in Solo was monopolized by the 
Mataram kingdom which was known as the centre of Javanese culture. 
Not only was that Islam was featured by Javanese syncretism, but the 
Islamization itself only covered a small number of people. Inevitably, , 
polarization of Muslims in Solo is very significant beside the fact of the 
fragmentation of religious authority. This phenomenon could also be 
seen from the fact that no mainstreaming school of Islam in Solo such 
as the Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). In the same way, 
some ‘local’ Islamic organization is mainstreaming in the region. 
Finally, the polarization of the Solonese and the fragmentation of 
religious authorities in Solo is featured by vast abangan community. 
Since the mid of the 18th century, Islam was a significant 
phenomenon in Surakarta kingdom. Historical account traces that 
Islam in Solo developed well since the reign of Susuhunan 
Pakubuwono II (1726-1749). The emergence of some royal poets such 
as Raden Ngabehi Ranggawarsita and their abundant works signed the 
dominant interpretation of Islam which was mixed with Javanese 
values, syncretism. The development of Islam in Solo was carried on 
by Susuhunan Pakubuwana IV (1788-1820) and Pakubuwana X (1893–
1939). With their authorities, the pesantren of Jamsaren (1800s) and 
Madrasah Mamba‘ al-‘Ulūm (1905) were established in Solo 
respectively. The control of the kingdoms and also the Dutch 
government, however, limited the independence of the institutions not 
only in interpreting Islam but also in disseminating it. Consequently, , 
Islam only spread on the higher level community and abangan Muslims 
is still majority in Solo. For this reason Ricklefs asserts that the 
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strength of Javanism (Kejawen, Jw) is not a hindrance for Javanese to be 
a radical or fundamentalist Muslims.16 
To discuss the development of Islam in Solo, it is worthwhile to 
describe some villages which were known as pious Muslim majority 
such as Kauman, Pasar Kliwon and Laweyan. The distinctiveness of 
these villages could be categorized as enclaves within the society. The 
division of communities to such enclaves was also intentionally 
designed for the role they have to carry out, such as Kauman for the 
aristocrats and Pasar Kliwon for Arabs. On the other hand, the 
arrangement was to distinguish their social statuses such as Kauman 
for santris (devout Muslims), and the rest regions are for abangan 
(nominal Muslims), including Pasar Kliwon and Laweyan. Although it 
seems that these three villages were well known as the centre of devout 
Muslims, history records that they did not have enough role in the 
process of Islamization in Solo. Although there were some devout 
Muslims, Haji Misbach as the propagator of Communism Islam prior 
to the independence of Indonesia is also from Kauman. In the same 
way, Laweyan was even the centre of red-Sarekat Islam (communism 
SI) although H. Samanhudi, the founder of the SI, is from this village. 
Finally, Arabs who resided at Pasar Kliwon also did not play any 
significant role in the development of Islam in the region. On this 
account, van den Berg states that only few colonies of Arabs were 
interested in Islamic preaching, but mostly in business. Moreover, he 
assert that most Arabs were reluctant to interact much with Javanese as 
they consider themselves had higher degree of social status.17 In the 
same way, indigenous ‘ulama>’s did not like to cooperate with Arabs. All 
this means that the role of Arabs in developing Islam in Solo was 
insignificant. The fact that the majority of Javanese residing at Pasar 
Kliwon sub-district are abangan is another evidence. 
Finally, the mass majority of abangan in Solo is also represented by 
the existence of Javanese mysticism (aliran kebatinan) in region. Not 
only is Solo the most widely spread of some Javanese mysticisms, it 
also the place of the establishment of several of them. Among various 
Javanese mysticisms, Sangkan Paran, Pangestu, Sumarah, Sapto 
                                                                
16 For this issue see M.C. Rickelfs, “Islam and the Reign of Pakubuwono II, 1726-
1749,” in Peter G. Riddell and Tony Street, Islam: Essays on Scripture, Thought and Society: 
A Festschrift in Honour of Anthony H. Johns (Leiden: Brill, 1997), pp. 238-252. 
17 Further on this account, see L.W.C. van den Berg, Hadramaut dan Koloni Arab di 
Nusantara (Jakarta: INIS, 1989), pp. 103-104. 
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Darmo, and Subud are widely accepted in Solo. The first two even 
founded in Solo, although in their later development they take other 
cities as their centres. Solo is among several important branch of 
Sangkan Paran, an oldest sect in Java.18 Although Sumarah is not 
centred in Solo, the region has an important role in this Javanese 
mysticisms. Due to the dynamic development of this sect in term of its 
‘worships’, the Sumarah of Solo is becoming the gate for Westerners to 
follow this Javanese mysticisms. Hence, Paul Stange asserts that 
Sumarah has many things in common with Islam rather than their 
similarity on the meaning of their names.19 Further, he states that such 
Javanese mysticisms as Sumarah could also be seen as part of the 
process of Islamization.20 In my view, however, the abangan majority of 
the Solonese and the existence of some Javanese mysticism reflect the 
discontinued process of Islamization in Solo. Along with the limited 
range of Islamization, on the other hand, Christianization is also 
significant phenomenon since the Dutch colonialism.  
In the early years of the New Order, the Christianization among 
the abangan majority had given to the rise of Islamic revivalism in Solo. 
The role of M. Natsir and Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia 
(Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council, DDII) was quite significant 
to the process of re-Islamization in the region. For this purpose, the 
DDII branch of Solo was founded along with the DDII of Central 
Java in Semarang. On a speech prior to the establishment of the DDII 
in Solo, Natsir strongly recommended the Solonese Muslims to 
establish more pesantrens and hospitals to counter the escalating 
efforts of Christianization in Solo. Eventually, the leader of the DDII 
of Solo, Abdullah Sungkar established a pesantren at the abangan 
majority community, Ngruki. Ahmad Khusnan, former leader of the 
DDII branch of Solo, acknowledges that Kustati and Yayasan Rumah 
Sakit Islam (Yarsis) Islamic hospitals were also established due to the 
financial assistance of the DDII as parts of the DDII’s efforts to 
encounter Christianization in the region. In general, I tend to conclude 
that radical Islamism arising from Solo in the end of 1970s and early 
                                                                
18 Andrew Beatty, Varieties of Javanese Religion: An Anthropological Account (UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 188. 
19 The term ‘Sumarah’ essentially means submission in Javanese what ‘Islam’ means in 
Arabic. 
20 Paul Stange, The Innner of Islamization of Java (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis at Murdoch 
University, 1980), p. 7. 
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1980s was due partly to the escalation of Christianization in Solo, 
beside the fact that the pressure of the government. 
As far as Islam in Solo is concerned, no single school of Islam is 
flourishing in Solo. Since the early of the ‘age of motion’, the abangan 
Solonese had been captured by the Sarekat Islam (SI). The ‘tension’ 
between Muhammadiyah and NU in Solo ended up with the Congress 
of ‘Ulama>’s at Pasar Kliwon in 1926. Ultimately, neither 
Muhammadiyah nor NU could be mainstream Islam in the region, 
even more at the ex-residency of Surakarta at large. The development 
of Islam in the region during the Old and New Order period was 
mostly influenced by ‘local’ schools of Islam. Since there is no single 
Islamic organization or ‘Ulama>’ having authority on Islam, Muslims in 
Solo are fragmented and diverge in many different schools of Islam. 
Finally, current development of Islam was fully characterized by local 
Islamic organizations which among them are radical. 
Social and Political Deprivation  
Along with the nominal characteristic of the Solonese, social and 
political deprivation played a significant role in the fragmentation of 
the society. In fact, the social deprivation is preceded by the ethnic 
problems in the city. The failure of indigenization of several other 
ethnics rather than Javanese in Solo brought about economic 
deprivation of the society. The fact that religious leaders do not play a 
significant role in Solo is also supported by the reality that neither 
traditional nor modern Solo municipality leaders do not pay their 
attentions to the society. History records that the patron-client system 
was not maintained well especially during the Dutch occupation. 
Finally, the political deprivation has given to the destruction of social 
system. The emergence of such radical Islamic groups as Sarekat Islam 
or Jama’ah Islamiyah is only a symptom of this fragmentation.  
Solo is characterized by its plural society since the beginning of its 
existence. There are many ethnic populations living in Solo such as 
Javanese, Arabs, and Chinese.21 Like other plural cities in Indonesia, 
ethnicity has been becoming a sensitive issue. The difficulties and 
inability of ethnics especially Chinese to immerse to the Javanese 
society is one of the reason of the disparity between Chinese and 
                                                                
21 In fact, there are many other ethnics in the city, i.e. Banjarese and Maduranese. 
However, since their numbers are not quite significant, their existence is not quite 
significant in Solo in many respects. 
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Javanese. The diverse communities in Solo have been heightened by 
the diverse religions as a touchy entity. Conversely, Arabs who have 
the same religion and to some extend cultures could easily submerge 
with Java Solonese. The Arabs’ acculturation was also supported by the 
fact that many Arabs married with Javanese women.22 In fact, this 
social situation is among the legacy of Dutch colonial government. 
Regardless of some complex and uneasiness of the Chinese in 
Indonesia during that period in general,23 the Chinese had such kind of 
privileges from the government. Their status as the second class, the 
same as Arabs, is completely different from the third class Javanese. 
The ability of Chinese to adapt to new social changes and play in it 
made them capable of surviving in new situation.24 All above 
privileges, social status, residential situation and opportunities or 
political access have led to such kind of social gap between Chinese in 
the one hand and Javanese on the other.  
Since the beginning of the Solonese history, the lower level of 
abangan Javanese majority has been deprived socially as well as 
economically. The social stratification during the Dutch occupation 
had put the abangan Javanese into the lowest level after the Dutch and 
Javanese priyayi (high level class) at the top level, while Arabs and 
Chinese on the second level.25 This privilege of the Dutch gave also 
possibilities not only for Chinese to live at urban areas, but also other 
business conveniences. Eventually, the lower level of abangan Javanese 
were marginalized not only socially, but also economically. Such social 
and economic situation did not change significantly until recently. 
                                                                
22 According to van den Berg, only few Arab-born women stayed for long period in 
Indonesia. That is among the reason why most Arabs married with Indonesian 
women. Most Arabs in Indonesia the 20th century were born in Indonesia. The 
existence of sayyid as the descendants of Prophet Muhammad is among the exception. 
See L.W.C. van den Berg, Hadramaut dan Koloni Arab di Nusantara. Jakarta: INIS, 1989 
(the original book was in Dutch and published in 1887). 
23 On this account, see Leo Suryadinata, Pribumi Indonesians, the Chinese Minority and 
China: A Study of Perceptions and Policies (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 
2005); Jemma Purdey, Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996-1999 (Leiden: KITLV, 
2006). 
24 Further see M.C. Ricklefs, Yogyakarta di Bawah Sultan Mangkubumi 1749-1792: Sejarah 
Pembagian Jawa (Yogyakarta: Matabangsa, 2002). 
25 On the account of Arabs in Java see Sumit K. Mandal, Finding Their Place: A History of 
Arabs in Java under Dutch Rule, 1800-1924 (Unpublished PhD thesis at Columbia 
University, 1994). 
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Although many of the lower level Javanese today are living at the 
periphery of urban areas, they are constantly marginalized 
economically. Current success of Chinese in business is another social 
jealousy which adds another social gap with the lower level Javanese. 
In turn, recurring anti-Chinese riot has become long-lasting crucial 
issue in Solo. Interestingly enough, most riots caused by any social 
problems would finally lead to the destruction of Chinese properties.26 
The absence of such social cohesion among the Solonese is also 
another major factor to the social fragmentation. The hegemonic 
power of the Solo kingdoms during the Dutch occupation is another 
deprivation of the abangan). The aristocrats of the Kasunanan and 
Mangkunegaran kingdoms have not been playing a significant role in 
the society. Since the very beginning of the history of Solo (Surakarta) 
in the 18th century, politics was becoming a dominant issues among the 
aristocrats which finally split the Mataram kingdom into several 
kingdoms. The inability of the aristocrats to handle all social problems 
had drawn the involvement of Dutch business company (VOC) in 
both internally or externally social problems. The rise of the Sarekat 
Islam in the early 20th century as the peak of social protest to the 
hegemony of the authoritarian Dutch government was not responded 
positively by the aristocrats. This ignorance was supported by the 
disharmonic relationship between the Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran 
kingdoms which is lasting until recently. The social gap between the 
aristocrats and kawula27 (lower class people) was not well mediated by 
the priyayi (upper class people). Upon the emergence of the Sarekat 
Islam, Kuntowijoyo asserts that it was as a result of collectively sub-
conscious culture due to the failure of the priyayis mediate between raja 
and kawula. Until the independence of Indonesia in 1945, the 
kingdoms let alone Kasunanan reluctantly acknowledged the new state 
and still accepted the return of Dutch government in 1948. The 
detachment of the Kasunanan to the lower class people was responded 
by the reluctant of the people to the planning of Indonesian 
                                                                
26 On this issue, see Jemma Purdey “The ‘other’ May riots: anti-Chinese violence in 
Solo, May 1998,” in Charles A. Coppel, Violent conflicts in Indonesia: Analysis, 
Representation, Resolution (New York: Routledge, 2006). 
27 For the case of social class during that time, I tend to employ Kuntowijoyo’s 
category: raja-priyayi-kawulo (king-upper class-lower class). Further on this account, see 
on his work, Raja, Priyayi & Kawulo: Surakarta 1900-1915 (Yogyakarta: Penerbit 
Ombak, 2004), p. 9. 
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government to give the Kasunanan a special autonomous region in 
1946. The social actions in the name of anti-Swapraja (anti-autonomous 
government) were supported by majority of the Solonese.28 the failure 
of the kingdoms to be the pillar of such social cohesion for the society, 
to some extend, have split the unity of the society. This historical 
accounts show the seemingly less awareness of current authorities of 
the Solo municipality to this socio-cultural problems. These latent 
problems will continuously laying within this community unless there 
are such well-planned schemas to overcome the root of the problems 
properly. 
Finally, the emergence of such radical Islamic groups could not be 
detached from the tension between the state and Muslims especially 
during the New Order. As argued by many, the Iranian revolution, the 
successful struggle against Soviet in Afghanistan, and the gains made 
by Islamic Brotherhood in Egypt have given to the rise of some 
Islamic revivalism in many Southeast Asian countries, including 
Indonesia. The emergence of such Islamic revivalism in Indonesia in 
the early of 1980s was responded negatively by the government. The 
government even considered Muslims as one of the obstacle of 
Indonesian development. This harsh relationship, finally, led to several 
conflicts between the state and Muslims in many different forms. 
Although this situation improved during the last ten years of the New 
Order regime, such situation to some extend has deprived Muslims.  
Globalized-Islam and Radical Islamism in Solo 
The phenomenon of radical Islamism in Solo would be best 
described as a resistant movement. In other words, the emergence of 
some radical Islamic groups could be seen as social movements which 
resist social changes that mostly do not accommodate their need. In 
some cases, social movements often serve to gradualize the process of 
social changes. In the case of Solo, however, some radical Islamic 
groups even want to alter the changes to support their necessities. The 
majority of lower level abangan society in Solo has been deprived not 
only in economics, but also social and political life. . Economic, social, 
and political developments in Solo in particular and in Indonesia in 
general do not accommodate their necessities, but even discontent 
them. In this respects, they see Islam as an alternative to solve their 
                                                                
28 Soedarmono and Muh. Amin, Solusi Konflik Pribumi dan non-Pribumi di Kota Solo 
(Laporan Penelitian Dosen Muda at UNS, 2002), p. 1. 
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problems. Islamic teachings which they find not merely as religion but 
as a complete social system is the ultimate solution for all their 
problems. Therefore, it could be said that it is such an instant process 
of Islamization since they just ‘leap’ from abangan to Islam without 
undergoing necessary processes. Similar to what happened during the 
“age of motion”, it may also possible that they do not really undergo 
such a process of Islamization; they just take a certain aspects of Islam 
(i.e., Sarekat Islam) to elevate them from their hopeless situation. 
Therefore, the involvement of such prominent Islamic organizations as 
Muhammadiyah and NU is very urgent to the Islamization process of 
the abangan society. Otherwise, such radical Islamic groups would 
consistently emerge from this society. 
Globalization and modernization as the mainstream of the current 
world has drastically changed the world. Not only was globalization 
has shrunk the world, but it also brought about cultural fragmentation 
on regional levels.29 Further Tibi, who share views with Geertz on 
culture, looks at cultures as a framework for social production of 
meaning and then determine it on local situation. Accordingly, it was 
due to globalization that political Islam arises in most Muslim 
countries in the world. In the aftermath of the Iranian revolution in 
1979, religious fanaticism and revivalism are arising in these countries, 
including Indonesia. The rapid mainstream of information and 
technology has marginalized the role of religion in the society. 
Conventional Islamic preaching, therefore, could no longer restrain the 
mainstream of modernization from the West. Inevitably, some 
communities felt that their culture and identities were in severe 
conditions; some of them may lose their social exchange, in economics 
for instance. The unavailability of a communication space for the 
community with the government has led them to such kind of social 
tension. In such plural society as Solo, a certain policy which does not 
accommodate to all parts of society will always be a seed of dispute. 
In the perspective of some Islamic fundamentalism, modernization 
is viewed as an immense threat for Muslims since it is not only a 
concept but it is a social process which produces social products. One 
of significant consequent of modernity is the institutional differentia-
tion of religious and secular spheres which was accompanied by the 
                                                                
29 Basam Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder 
(England: University of California Press, 2002), p. xvii. 
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privatization of religion as well as its marginalization.30 Moaddel, 
however, tends to see the phenomenon of radical Islamic groups 
because of the ideological contentions in the Islamic world.31 For that 
reason, some ‘ulama>’s frame globalization and modernization as a part 
of ghazw al-fikr. In addition, the hegemonic power of the West allows 
Westerners to introduce any regulations which would enable them to 
gain much benefit for themselves such as the invasion of Palestine and 
Iraq in the name of war on terrorism. In this point, Hart asserts that 
radical Islamism in Indonesia as well as in several other parts of 
Southeast Asia such as Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippine are 
among the phenomena of Muslims’ solidarity.32 Conclusively, the 
overwhelmingly emergence of Islamic political parties, radical Islamism 
groups, and vigilante forces in many parts of Indonesia are among the 
outcomes of globalization and modernization. 
On the other hand, massive demographic changes as a result of 
modernization are also another factor to the rise of radical Islamism. 
Oliver Roy argues that Islamist movements in some secular nationalist 
government are among the result of unprecedented demographic 
change.33 Modernization in the form of economic development which 
is mostly take place in urban areas has attracted more rural families to 
come to the cities. The inability of the government to grasp all 
unemployment people has given to the rise of jobless at the periphery 
of the cities. Eventually, such this discontent society is easily mobilized 
by any social movements. In the context of Solo, this demographic 
shift has fuelled Islamism. Aside from the escalating social problems in 
this slum community, many of them are engaged with Islamic activities 
which to some extend offer them such instant remedy to their current 
problems. Undeniably, many activists of radical Islamism in Solo are 
from this lower level community. 
                                                                
30 R. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation (New 
York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), p. 3. 
31 Mansour Muaddel and Kamran Talattof, “Contemporary debates in Islam: modern-
ism vs fundamentalism: an anthology of Islamic thought,” in Mansour Muaddel and 
Kamran Talattof (eds), Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam: a Reader (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), p. 3. 
32 Natasha Hamilton-Hart, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Expert Analysis, Myopia and 
Fantasy” in The Pacific Review, vol. 18 No (3 September 2005): pp. 314-315. 
33 Further see, Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1996). 
  
 
Muhammad Wildan 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 07, Number 01, June 2013 
66 
Finally, the dramatic political shift to Reformation Era is the 
trigger of the emergence radical Islamism. Most social discontents 
which were forcefully suppressed by the New Order finally emerge 
following the decline of the regime. Social conflicts are becoming the 
most common phenomena of horizontal precariousness. Horizontal 
tensions in the forms of religious conflicts such as in Ambon and Poso 
are escalating during this period. The inability of the authorities to 
address the religious problems properly is such a ‘political opportunity 
structure’ which gave a chance for social actors to establish social 
movements. In the Solo context, this political opportunity has also 
given rise to the Islamic radical groups, or the resurgence of old radical 
Islamic groups. On the other hand, it was also due partly to the failure 
of the local government to grasp social figures and give them 
meaningful access to political institutions34 which led to the emergence 
of some radical Islamic groups. The re-emergence of Pondok Ngruki 
and jama’ah Gumuk in the form of the JI and FPIS respectively, and 
the establishment of some vigilante forces such as Laskar Jundullah 
and Laskar Hisbullah are among the result of this political 
conduciveness.  
Some of the lower level abangan Solonese perceived the emergence 
of Islamic revivalism as an opportunity to resolve their social 
problems. Therefore, it could be clearly seen that most members of the 
above Islamic radical groups, including the vigilante forces, are mostly 
from abangan deprived-community at the periphery of Solo. Some 
Islamic terms have been used by these groups to attract more people 
to be involved in their own communities. Along with the convictions 
that Islam is the ultimate solution of the world disorder, shari >‘ah and 
anti-West are among the most prolific issues to incite people to be 
involved in such radical Islamism groups. Nevertheless, different from 
some other radical Islamic groups such as in Banten, Garut, 
Tasikmalaya, and Bulukumba which fervently demand the implement-
tation of shari >‘ah as regional regulation (perda), the Islamic groups in 
Solo are not strong enough to demand such regulation. Although there 
are many abangan deprived-socially “converted” and involved in these 
religious radical groups, their number are not as significant compared 
to those who are not “provoked” and remains as ordinary abangan.  
                                                                
34 Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in Islamic World 
(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), p. xv. 
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Conclusion 
Solo is prolific for radical Islamic groups. The existence of the 
Pondok Ngruki, jama’ah Gumuk, and some Islamic vigilante forces in 
the city verify this assumption. The above phenomena also confirm 
that Pondok Ngruki and its related Islamic radical movements are not 
the single phenomenon of Islamic radicalism in Solo. However, it 
should be noted here that the Islamic vigilante groups hardly be 
categorized as radical since they concern more on moral issues and not 
on fundamental issues such as shari>‘ah or Islamic state. Moreover, these 
organizations do not have obvious views on Islamic values as other 
groups. However, I deliberately do not use rigid category in this case 
since there are many possibilities that these vigilante forces would turn 
into social movements due to favourable socio-political and cultural 
condition. Since in many cases these vigilante forces were involved in 
some radical violence, these groups could be categorized as radical in a 
broader term. Although some radical Islamic groups emerge in Solo, 
the demand for the implementation of shari>‘ah is not as in other 
regions such as Garut, Banten and Bulumkumba. In fact, the radical 
Islamism in Solo has not mainstreaming yet.  
The phenomenon of radical Islamism in Solo is as a result of many 
socio-cultural and political factors. Social discontent economically and 
politically since the beginning of the 20th century is among the most 
fundamental factors to the rise social deprivation. The lack of religious 
and traditional leaders in Solo society also led them to be such kind of 
loosely abangan society. It was globalization and political conduciveness 
which finally incite such moveable society into certain social 
movements. The involvement of some people in some radical Islamic 
groups is among their choice to resolve their socio-cultural problems 
they have undergone so far. In other words, radical Islamic activism is 
among some other social radicalism activisms which could happen in 
this society. In my view, the socio-cultural problems are still laying 
beneath the social structure of the Solonese which may explode if 
some political opportunities happened as the trigger to the emergence 
of a social movement. Compared to the mass support to the SI during 
the ‘age of motion’, to borrow Shiraishi’s term, some present radical 
Islamic groups’ offers to resolve some social problems are not 
touching the hearth of the loosely abangan society yet. In other words, 
although there are some radical Islamic groups in the region, these 
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groups are not mainstreaming in Solo. This situation is due mostly to 
the success of some da`wah activities among these communities. 
Finally, the role of some moderate Islamic organizations is very 
urgent to reduce such radical Islamism in Solo. In other words, they 
should intensify their da`wah activities to touch the vast abangan 
majority in the region. Although such big Islamic organizations as 
Muhammadiyah and NU are not widely spread in Solo, it does not 
mean that the Solonese reject these organizations. Their previous 
failure of da`wah could lead them to change their methods of da`wah. In 
addition, such coordinative agendas should be made between all 
moderate organizations to involve the society into their mainstream 
accordingly. As in other parts of Indonesia that NU is accepted well 
among the suburb areas, this organization could play in this level 
which is still abangan majority. Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah and also the 
Majelis Tafsir Alquran (MTA) which already has some networks 
among abangan in urban areas could broaden their networks within the 
areas. In addition, the role of some students’ Islamic organizations 
such as the Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (Muslim 
Student Action Union, KAMMI), Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah 
(Muhammadiyah Student Union, IMM), and Himpunan Mahasiswa 
Islam (Muslim Student Association, HMI) are absolutely needed to 
broaden their da`wah activities not only among university students but 
also among the society, especially the abangan. The role of authorities 
to diverge all agendas of this huge process of santrinisasi (re-
Islamization) is also necessary, beside their main task to give some 
religious leaders in Solo some political access. Such comprehensive 
approach should be employed to reduce abangan majority and include 
them in the current mainstream of moderate Islam in Indonesia. [] 
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